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Abstract 
We draw attention to the role of economic geography in explaining important cross-sectional 
facts  which  are  difficult  to  account  for  in  existing  models  of  industrialization.  By 
construction,  closed-economy  models  that  stress  the  role  of  local  demand  in  generating 
sufficient  expenditure  on  manufacturing  goods  are  not  suited  to  explain  the  strong  and 
negative  correlation  between  distance  to  the  world’s  main  markets  and  levels  of 
manufacturing  activity  in  the  developing  world.  Secondly,  open-economy  models  that 
emphasize the importance of comparative advantage are at odds with a positive correlation 
between the ratio of agricultural to manufacturing productivity and shares of manufacturing 
in GDP. This paper provides a potential explanation for these puzzles by nesting the above 
theories in a multi-location model with trade costs. Using a number of simple analytical 
examples and a full-scale multi-country calibration, we show that the model can replicate the 
above stylized facts. 
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 H. Breinlich and A. Cuñat, submitted 2011 1 Introduction
One of the most striking aspects of economic development is the decline of agriculture￿ s share
in GDP and the corresponding rise of manufacturing and services. Economists have proposed a
number of theories to explain this transformation. Among the most in￿ uential approaches are
explanations that focus on di⁄erences in the income elasticity of demand across sectors (e.g.,
Rosenstein-Rodan (1943); Murphy et al. (1989b); Kongsamut et al. (2001)). As per-capita
income increases, non-homothetic preferences lead to a shift of demand from agriculture to man-
ufacturing goods, thus increasing manufacturing￿ s share in GDP. Traditionally, these approaches
have analyzed closed-economy models and stressed the role of local demand. More recently, au-
thors such as Matsuyama (1992, 2009) have provided extensions to open-economy settings and
have shown that some key results of the closed-economy literature, such as the positive impact
of increased agricultural productivity on industrialization, can be reversed in such models.
The present paper draws attention to two cross-sectional facts which, taken together, are not
easily explained by either closed-economy or open-economy models of demand-driven industrial-
ization. We argue that to understand these facts we need to move beyond the closed-versus-open-
economy dichotomy prevalent in the literature, and to consider multi-country settings in which
countries interact with each other through international trade, but in which bilateral interactions
are partly hampered (to a di⁄erent extent across country pairs) by the fact that trade is not
costless.
Our ￿rst observation is that proximity to foreign sources of demand seems to matter for
industrialization. For example, it has long been noted that Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan
not only bene￿tted from an outward-oriented trade policy but also close proximity to the large
Japanese market (e.g., Puga and Venables (1996)). A cursory look at the data suggests that
distance to foreign markets has a more general relevance: Figure 1 plots the manufacturing share
in GDP against the minimum distance to the European Union, Japan and the U.S. for a cross-
section of developing countries in 2000.1 The ￿gure shows that developing economies close to one
of these main markets of the world show proportionally higher levels of industrialization.
Whereas this ￿rst fact suggests that interactions between economies are important, and thus
points to the relevance of open-economy models, our second fact seems to suggest the oppo-
site: Figure 2 plots manufacturing shares against a standard proxy for comparative advantage
in agriculture, labor productivity in agriculture relative to manufacturing, for a cross-section of
developing countries for the year 2000.2 The ￿tted line has a positive, albeit statistically insignif-
icant slope. As we show in our more detailed econometric analysis in Section 2, extending the
sample to include more countries and years leaves this positive correlation intact and actually
makes it statistically signi￿cant as well. This is of course puzzling for open-economy theories of
1We use the Netherlands as the approximate geographic centre of the European Union in Figure 1. Developing
countries are de￿ned as countries belonging to the income categories ￿low￿ , ￿lower middle￿and ￿upper middle￿
published by the World Bank (corresponding to less than 9,265 USD in 1999). The simple OLS regression underlying
the ￿tted line in Figure 1 yields a negative slope coe¢ cient which is statistically signi￿cant at the 1% level.
2Developing countries are de￿ned as in footnote 1. Relative productivy in agriculture vs. manufacturing is the
proxy of choice in many studies of Ricardian comparative advantage, e.g. Golub and Hsieh (2000).
2industrialization such as Matsuyama (1992). If countries are indeed integrated through trade,
should we not expect them to specialize according to their comparative advantages?
We argue that both facts can be understood in a standard model of industrialization in which
there are di⁄erences in the income elasticity of demand across sectors and in which comparative
advantage forces are present and active. The key di⁄erence of our approach in comparison with
existing closed-economy approaches is that we allow for a setting with many countries which
are integrated through trade. But crucially, and in contrast to open-economy models such as
Matsuyama (1992), trade is not costless and geographic position is therefore important.
In our model, developing countries closer to foreign sources of demand will experience higher
demand for both the agricultural and manufacturing goods they produce than more distant coun-
tries, ceteris paribus. We outline conditions under which this translates into higher manufacturing
shares in GDP. Most importantly, higher overall demand will lead to higher wages which, in the
presence of non-homotheticity in demand combined with positive trade costs, will shift local
production towards the manufacturing sector. Trade costs for agricultural products also ham-
per the comparative-advantage mechanism put forward by free-trade models. High agricultural
productivity leads to higher wages which, again because of the combination of agricultural trade
costs and non-homothetic demand, leads countries to specialize in manufacturing (we call this
the ￿relative-demand e⁄ect￿of agricultural productivity). The standard comparative-advantage
e⁄ect, which would drive specialization patterns in the opposite direction, is also present but can
be overcompensated by the relative-demand e⁄ect for intermediate levels of trade costs.
Given that our model nests free trade and autarky as special cases and that its predictions
vary depending on the level of trade costs and other parameters (such as the degree of non-
homotheticity of preferences), we complement our theoretical analysis with a full-scale multi-
country calibration. That is, we ask to what extent our model matches the above stylized facts
for empirically plausible parameter values. We choose parameters to match international trade
and expenditure data and demonstrate that this calibrated model generates the same positive
correlation observed in the data between access to markets and comparative advantage in agri-
culture, on the one hand, and manufacturing shares on the other hand. Crucially, this is not true
when we constrain our trade cost estimates to zero (free trade) or in￿nity (autarky). Interest-
ingly, allowing for positive but ￿nite levels of trade costs also improves the predictive power (in
terms of matching observed and predicted shares) as opposed to autarky and free trade.
Our paper relates to at least three sets of contributions in the literature. In terms of the
questions addressed, we contribute most directly to the literature on industrialization that relies
on di⁄erences in the income elasticity of demand across sectors for explaining structural change
(￿demand-driven industrialization￿ ). We add to this literature by drawing attention to the role
of economic geography in shaping cross-sectional patterns of industrialization. Similar to papers
such as Murphy et al. (1989a, b), Matsuyama (1992) or Laitner (2000) we focus on the initial
shift from agriculture to manufacturing, which is the key transition for the group of countries we
are interested in in this paper, i.e. low- to middle-income countries. That is, for most of the paper
we do not model the services sector, which rises with income per capita at all levels of economic
3development, and which is not subject to open-economy analytical treatments due to its non-
tradability. However, as we show in our robustness checks, explicitly modelling a non-tradable
services sector leaves our results unchanged.
Consistent with our focus on explaining cross-sectional facts, we also disregard the dynamic
aspects of the industrialization process and rely on an entirely static model. In this respect, we
are similar to the contributions by Murphy et al. (1989a, b) and Matsuyama (2009) but di⁄erent
from most other papers in the industrialization literature. Our approach, however, avoids the
criticism by Ventura (1997) and Matsuyama (2009), among others, of closed-economy dynamic
approaches to issues such as industrialization; namely that explaining cross-country patterns
taking place in a globalized world on the basis of dynamic closed-economy arguments can be
quite misleading. In fact, we extend this methodological criticism to the standard two-country,
free-trade way of thinking about trade and development: once one recognizes that bilateral
distances and geographic position matter, one must extend the model to many countries and
allow for di⁄erences in bilateral trade costs.
While our criticisms apply most directly to theories that approach the phenomenon of in-
dustrialization from the demand side, the stylized facts we have presented are not easily ex-
plained by models that focus on supply-side determinants either, be it contributions from the
barriers-to-modern-growth literature (e.g., Parente and Prescott (1994) and (2000), Goodfriend
and McDermott (1995), or Galor and Weil (2000)), attempts to reconcile balanced (neoclassical)
growth or convergence with structural transformations (e.g., Caselli and Coleman (2001) or Ngai
and Pissarides (2007)) or approaches from traditional international trade theory (e.g., Leamer
(1987) and Schott (2003)). The ageographical nature of these approaches means that they are not
well suited to explain phenomena that have an inherent geographic component, such as the ones
described above. Thus, while not denying the importance of these models and theories for many
aspects of industrialization, this paper draws attention to geographical proximity as a new and
potentially important factor in explaining the dramatic di⁄erences in levels of industrialization
across the world.3
Methodologically, our paper is most closely related to work in international trade and eco-
nomic geography which is interested in the e⁄ects of comparative advantage and relative location
on trade ￿ ows, wages, and production structures (e.g., Krugman (1980), Puga and Venables
(1999), Golub and Hsieh (2000), Davis and Weinstein (2003), or Redding and Venables (2004),
to name but a few). To the best of our knowledge, however, the insights from this literature have
never been applied to the aforementioned stylized facts, nor to the modelling of cross-sectional
patterns in levels of industrialization more generally. Some of our results are also relevant for the
international trade literature beyond our immediate focus on industrialization. For example, the
role of trade costs in modifying the impact of comparative advantage on production structures
3In a recent working paper, Yi and Zhang (2010) share our concern that many aspects of industrialization
cannot be analyzed neither within a closed-economy setting nor under free trade. They analyze the e⁄ects of
changes in productivity and declining trade barriers on production structures within a three-sector, two-country
model, but focus on dynamic rather than cross-sectional aspects of industrialization. Restricting their analysis to
a two-country setting also prevents them from adequately modelling economic geography. (For this, at least three
countries are needed as will become clear in Section 3).
4has been mostly ignored in the literature, although our results suggest that models based on a
free-trade assumption may have poor explanatory power.4 Theoretically, we contribute to the
home-market e⁄ect literature by outlining conditions under which more central locations special-
ize in manufacturing once we leave the standard setting of monopolistic competition and factor
price equalization.5
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 shows that the two correlations
displayed in Figures 1 and 2 also survive in a broader cross-section of countries, and are robust to
the inclusion of proxies for local demand and other domestic factors. Section 3 develops a multi-
country model with trade costs. This model is used in Section 4 to shed light on the puzzles
raised in the introduction. In Section 5 we show that a fully calibrated version of the model is
able to replicate our stylized facts. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2 Empirical Evidence
In this section, we examine the robustness of the correlations from the introduction through
variations in sample composition and by including a number of control variables.6 Our full
econometric speci￿cation will be
ltShareMlt = ￿ + dt + ￿1RPlt + ￿2CENlt + ￿3APlt + ￿4POPlt + "lt; (1)
where RPlt is relative productivity (of agriculture to manufacturing) and CENlt the ￿ centrality￿
of country l, i.e., its access to foreign markets (to be de￿ned below). APlt denotes agricultural
productivity, POPlt the population size of country l, and dt is a full set of year ￿xed e⁄ects.
The dependent variable is the logistic transformation of a country￿ s share of manufacturing value
added in GDP. We use a logistic transformation to account for the fact the manufacturing share is
limited to a range between 0 and 1.7 Concerning the regressors, we discuss the choice of suitable
empirical proxies in turn. Additional details on the data and their sources, as well as a list of
countries used in the regressions below are contained in Appendix A.
Keeping in line with existing studies on Ricardian comparative advantage (e.g., Golub and
Hsieh, 2000), we use labor productivity as a proxy for productivity. In contrast to total factor
productivity, this has the advantage of considerably increasing the number of available observa-
tions.
We measure country l￿ s centrality (CENlt) as the sum of all other countries￿GNP, weighted
4An exception is Deardor⁄ (2004).
5Also see Davis (1998) and Hanson and Xiang (2004).
6These are the correlations we will aim at reproducing in our calibration exercise.
7Using untransformed manufacturing shares instead does not change any of the qualitative results reported
below. We have also experimented with including the share of services in GDP as an additional control variable,
again without ￿nding any signi￿cant changes in the other coe¢ cient estimates (both sets of results are available
from the authors upon request).






This speci￿cation re￿ ects the basic intuition of our discussion. What matters is centrality in an
economic geography sense, that is proximity to markets for domestic products. Of course, the
above centrality index is closely related to the concept of market potential ￿rst proposed by Harris
(1954), which has been frequently used in both geography and ￿more recently ￿in economics. A
number of studies have demonstrated that this simple proxy has strong explanatory power and
yields results very similar to more complex approaches that estimate trade costs from trade ￿ ow
gravity equations (see, for example, Head and Mayer (2006), or Breinlich (2006)).8
As additional control variables, we also include agricultural productiviy (AP) to account for
the pro-industrializing relative-demand e⁄ect discussed above, and population size (POP) as an
additional proxy for the extent of the domestic market. We have data for all the required variables
for 112 countries in 2000. Keeping in line with the focus of this paper on the industrialization
of developing countries, however, we exclude high-income countries from our regression sample
(although of course all available countries are used to calculate the centrality measure).9 In our
robustness checks, we will also brie￿ y present results for the full sample.10
In Table 1, we present a number of univariate correlations between the logistic transformation
of manufacturing shares and our proxies for comparative advantage (relative productivity, RP)
and centrality. Columns 1-2 replicate the correlations from Figures 1 and 2 and show that using a
logistic transformation of manufacturing shares as the dependent variable leads to similar results.
In column 3, we use our more sophisticated measure of centrality (2). Note that we would now
expect to ￿nd a positive and signi￿cant sign, which is indeed what we do. We also note that both
measures of centrality seem to be important determinants of levels of industrialization. They
explain around 10% of the cross-sectional variation of manufacturing shares in our sample. This
is comparable in magnitude to per-capita income whose positive correlation with manufacturing
shares in the initial phase of development is a key variable in much of the existing empirical
literature on cross-country patterns of industrialization (e.g., Syrquin and Chenery (1989)).
In columns 4-8, we undertake a ￿rst series of robustness checks. Column 4 uses data on
sector-speci￿c purchasing power parities to strip out the variation in prices from our relative
productivity measure, so that the remaining variation more closely re￿ ects physical productivity
di⁄erences (Appendix C provides additional details). As seen, using this re￿ned measure leaves
the correlation with manufacturing shares basically unchanged. In columns 5-6, we include a
dummy for China and the South-East Asian economies of Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia
and the Philippines. These countries are arguably special cases because of their very successful
8Using a nonstructural measure also seems to be better in line with the more explorative character of this
section.
9We use the World Bank￿ s income classi￿cation and exclude all countries with gross national income per capita
in excess of 9,265 USD in 1999 (￿high income countries￿ ).
10See footnote 34 in Section 5 and Appendix Table A.2.
6export-oriented industrialization strategies and are also potentially in￿ uential outliers in both
Figures 1 and 2. The corresponding dummy variable (not reported) is indeed positive and highly
signi￿cant but the coe¢ cient on our centrality measure remains almost unchanged. The positive
correlation between manufacturing shares and relative productivity is increased and becomes
statistically signi￿cant. In columns 7 and 8, we present results for additional years for which
comparable cross-sectional data on relative productivities is available (1980 and 2000, yielding
a unbalanced panel of 256 observations in total). Again, using these additional data makes the
results from columns 1 and 3 stronger.
In Table 2, we gradually build up our results to the full speci￿cation (1). In column 1
we include population size, column 2 uses agricultural productivity as an additional regressor,
and column 3 includes both population and agricultural productivity. In column 4, we drop
agricultural productivity and replace it with per-capita GDP. Per-capita GDP helps controlling
for the purchasing power of the local population, skill levels, and other potentially confounding
factors. Note, however, that it is very highly correlated with agricultural productivity so that
in practice both variables are likely to pick up the in￿ uence of similar omitted variables. The
high correlation also makes the inclusion of both variables in the same regression impossible.11
In columns 5-8, we again use our larger sample for the years 1980, 1990 and 2000.
Three main insights arise from these regressions. First, proxies for the size of the domestic
market are strongly positively correlated with levels of industrialization, as was to be expected
from prior results in the literature. Second, centrality retains its positive and signi￿cant in￿ uence
throughout. Third, comparative advantage in agriculture has a positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect
on industrialization whenever we do not control for absolute agricultural productivity, and an
insigni￿cant e⁄ect whenever we do. This suggests that relative productivity might be picking up
the in￿ uence of absolute productivity levels in agriculture.
Limited data availability for relative and absolute agricultural productivity prevents us from
estimating speci￿cation (1) for a yet larger sample. In columns 9-11, we exclude these variables
which increases the sample size more than tenfold since we can now use observations for every
year from 1980 to 2005. This allows us to provide some further results on the importance of
centrality for industrialization by running variations of the following speci￿cation:
ltShareMlt = ￿ + dt + dl + ￿1CENlt + ￿2PCGDPlt + ￿3POPlt + "lt; (3)
where PCGDPlt denotes per-capita GDP and dt and dl are a full set of time and country ￿xed
e⁄ects. Column 9 of Table 2 reports results for an OLS regression pooled over the period 1980-2005
with year dummies only. Column 10 estimates the full speci￿cation (3) by including country ￿xed
e⁄ects, thus eliminating any time-invariant heterogeneity across countries from our correlations.
Column 11 uses long ￿rst di⁄erences between 1980 and 2005. All regressions give a similar
picture as the results for the smaller sample: both the size of the domestic market and access to
foreign markets are positively correlated with levels of industrialization. If anything, controlling
11The correlations of the variables in logs is 84% in our sample.
7for country-speci￿c e⁄ects in columns 10 and 11 implies an even stronger role for centrality.12
3 The Model
Consider a world with countries j = 1;:::;R, each with Lj consumers, each of which supplies
one unit of labor inelastically. There are two sectors, agriculture and manufacturing; we assume
perfect labor mobility between sectors, and no international labor mobility. As we discuss in
Section 5.2 and Appendix D below, adding a third, non-tradable sector (i.e. services) complicates
the analysis but yields similar results, both qualitatively and (in our calibration) quantitatively.
Thus, for the sake of simplicity we abstract from the services sector for most of our analysis.
3.1 Demand Side
Preferences are identical across countries. Country-j individuals maximize a Stone-Geary utility
function over consumption of an agricultural and a manufacturing composite good:
Uj = ￿ln(Mj) + (1 ￿ ￿)ln(Aj ￿ A
ﬂ
); (4)



















Both Mj and Aj are Armington aggregators of country-speci￿c varieties: every country is assumed
to produce one di⁄erentiated variety.13 Mj is consumption of the manufacturing composite and
mlj is the amount of the variety produced in l that is consumed by an individual consumer in j.
Similarly, Aj is consumption of the agricultural composite and alj is the amount of the variety
produced in l that is consumed by an individual consumer in j. The elasticities of substitution
between varieties are constant at ￿M;￿A > 1.
A
ﬂ
> 0 denotes minimal consumption of agricultural goods, i.e. the subsistence level. These
preferences guarantee that above the level A
ﬂ
the expenditure share of agricultural goods declines
with rising per capita income. This is the so-called Engel￿ s law, which has strong empirical
foundations (see Crafts (1980)). We assume A
ﬂ
< ￿Al for all l, where ￿Al is agricultural productivity
in country l (to be de￿ned more precisely below). This assumption guarantees that per-capita
12The downside of omitting relative and absolute agricultural productivity is of course that their exclusion is
likely to lead to omitted variable bias. To verify the likely magnitude of this bias, we estimated both (1) and (3)
on the same samples used in columns 1-4 and 5-8. Comparing the coe¢ cient on CEN in these regressions does
indeed suggest that omitting AP and RP leads to an upward bias, albeit a small one.
13The Armington assumption ensures that all countries consume all varieties provided trade costs and elasticities
of substitution are ￿nite. This implies that all countries have diversi￿ed production structures in equilibrium, which
is the empirically relevant case and renders the model relatively tractable below.
8income in each country is su¢ cient to reach the subsistence level. Thus, at least some expenditure
will be devoted to manufacturing products.
Below we impose enough structure so that labor is the only source of income. The individual￿ s
budget constraint in country j is therefore given by PMjMj + PAjAj = wj, with wj denoting
the wage in j, equal across sectors. PMj and PAj are price indices for the manufacturing and
agricultural composite goods. Prices paid for the di⁄erent products in the importing location j,
pMlj and pAlj, consist of the mill price charged in country l plus industry-speci￿c bilateral trade
costs TM
lj ;TA
lj ￿ 1. (TM
jj = TA
jj = 1 for all j.) These trade costs are of the iceberg-type form: for
every unit of a good that is shipped from l to j, only 1=Tlj arrive while the rest ￿melts￿en route.
Utility maximization yields country-j individual￿ s demand for manufactured and agricultural
goods produced in l. Aggregating across individuals and countries, total demands (inclusive of


































































EMj = ￿(wj ￿ PAjA
ﬂ
)Lj and EAj = [(1 ￿ ￿)wj + ￿PAjA
ﬂ
]Lj denote total expenditures on man-
ufacturing and agricultural goods in country j, respectively.
3.2 Production
Each country produces a di⁄erentiated variety of the manufacturing and the agricultural goods.
Sectors are perfectly competitive, operate under constant returns to scale, and use labor as the
only input. The amount of labor employed in manufacturing in country l is denoted by LMl, and
supply of the local variety is ml = ￿MlLMl, where ￿Ml denotes productivity in manufacturing
in country l. The amount of labor employed in agriculture in country l is denoted by LAl, and
supply of the local variety is al = ￿AlLAl. Productivity levels are allowed to vary across countries
and sectors. Positive production implies f.o.b. prices equal the cost of producing one unit of
output: pMl = wl=￿Ml and pAl = wl=￿Al.
93.3 Equilibrium
Equilibrium in the manufacturing and agricultural goods markets requires al = aD








































































Notice these are functions of the vector of wages of all countries. Full employment requires

































5 = Ll: (15)
These are R non-linear equations in the R wage rates, determining the vector of wages and
subsequently all other equilibrium variables of the model.14
To summarize, the crucial features of this model that will drive the results in the remaining
sections are as follows. First, there are varying levels of agricultural and manufacturing productiv-
ity across locations, which together with non-homothetic preferences will drive industrialization
and de-industrialization through comparative advantage and Engel￿ s law. Second, positive trade
costs render relative geographical positions important, both by conferring a market size advan-
tage to more central regions and by softening the impact of comparative advantage across space.
As the focus of this paper is on industrialization, we also introduce the share of manufacturing in












14By Walras￿ s Law, one of these R equations is redundant.
104 Analysis
This section analyzes the properties of the model just developed and uses it to shed light on the
puzzles raised in the introduction. As will become clear, the present model nests some of the
existing approaches in the literature on demand-driven industrialization as the two special cases
of in￿nite and zero trade costs (￿closed economy￿and ￿free trade￿ ). We will demonstrate that
in the case with positive trade costs new results arise that help resolve our two puzzles.
4.1 Closed Economy
With in￿nitely high levels of trade costs, i.e. under autarky, it is easy to show that the expression









As is apparent from equation (MSAUT), the manufacturing share in GDP increases with agri-
cultural productivity. Non-homothetic preferences (due to the positive subsistence consumption
level in agriculture, A
ﬂ
> 0) are crucial for this result. Intuitively, the increases in per capita income
resulting from higher values of ￿Al lead to a decline in the share of subsistence consumption in to-
tal expenditure. As every unit of income above the subsistence level is spent in ￿xed proportions
on agricultural and manufacturing varieties, the expenditure share of the latter rises. In a closed
economy, this leads in turn to a shift of labor into manufacturing and an increase in ShareMl.
As discussed, we refer to this positive impact of agricultural productivity on industrialization as
the ￿relative-demand e⁄ect￿of agricultural productivity shocks. Very similar e⁄ects are obtained
in the existing literature (e.g. Matsuyama (1992) or Murphy et al. (1989b)). Needless to say, the
autarky assumption renders any cross-country di⁄erences in centrality or comparative advantage
completely irrelevant.
4.2 Free Trade
Under free trade, Ricardian comparative advantage emerges as the key factor for the determina-


















lower ratios ￿Ml=￿Al imply a stronger bias towards agriculture in the production structures of
countries. As in standard Ricardian models of international trade, being relatively productive in
agriculture biases a country￿ s production structure towards agriculture, thus reducing the share
of manufacturing in GDP as the location specializes accordingly. We will refer to this as the
11￿comparative advantage e⁄ect￿ . Notice that free trade eliminates any independent in￿ uence of
the productivity level ￿Al on industrialization via the non-homothetic preferences channel we
discussed above.
4.3 Costly Trade
In the presence of positive trade costs that are di⁄erent across country pairs, the model becomes
much less tractable. We therefore use simpli￿ed versions of the full model in a number of ex-
amples that illustrate the new types of results our model can yield in this new environment. In
Section 5 we relax these simplifying assumptions and solve the model numerically, using calibrated
parameter values.
It is a long-standing theoretical result in international trade theory that the size of the home
market matters for industrial structure (Krugman (1980), Krugman and Helpman (1985)). More
recently, Davis and Weinstein (1998, 2003) found empirical support for home market e⁄ects in
a study on OECD countries. However, their ￿nding depended crucially on taking into account
demand linkages across locations, indicating the importance of foreign demand.15 In models of
industrialization, however, the role of access to foreign markets has been ignored so far, even
though its inclusion seems to be a logical extension of the existing literature. In a world with
positive trade costs, central locations have e⁄ectively a larger market size as they are closer to
sources of demand, ceteris paribus. Note that this holds in addition to any size advantage the
domestic economy may have and depends on its position relative to other locations.
More central countries can bene￿t from their position to industrialize even in the absence of
any technological or size advantage, simply because being more central raises relative demand
for the central country￿ s manufacturing good. There are several theoretical reasons why one
would expect central locations to experience a larger relative demand for their manufacturing
goods than peripheral ones. First, being more central raises demand for both agricultural and
manufacturing goods and raises wages.16 With non-homothetic preferences, this leads to an
expansion of domestic manufacturing expenditure which, with positive trade costs, will translate
into a domestic manufacturing share higher than in other countries, as the resulting increase in
manufacturing expenditure will have a stronger e⁄ect on the domestic manufacturing good than
on those produced by other countries. The following particular case of our model illustrates this
mechanism.
Example 1 Consider a three-country world, R = 3, and a geographic structure such that
country 1 takes a ￿central￿position while countries 2 and 3, which are fully symmetric, are in the
￿periphery￿ : we model this by assuming that country 1 can trade with both 2 and 3 at positive
but ￿nite trade costs (T12 = T21 = T13 = T31 = T > 1) and that countries 2 and 3 cannot trade
with one another (T23 = T32 = 1).17 Trade costs are assumed equal across sectors. We simplify
15Indeed, in an earlier version of the same paper, Davis and Weinstein (1996) interpreted local demand as purely
domestic and ignored linkages across borders, and were unable to detect home market e⁄ects.
16See Redding and Venables (2004) for empirical evidence on the positive e⁄ect of centrality on income levels.
17For the sake of the argument, we rule out the possibility that countries 2 and 3 can trade via country 1.
12further by assuming ￿M = ￿A = ￿. Finally, we choose all parameters to be identical across
countries (except for the bilateral trade costs) and, in particular, we set ￿Aj = ￿Mj = Lj = 1.
Pro￿ting from the symmetry we have imposed, let us normalize w2 = w3 = 1.
It is easy to show that we cannot have an equilibrium in which w1 = 1, as the model￿ s market
clearing conditions would be violated. We can prove this by contradiction. If it were the case
that w1 = w2 = w3 = 1, then aggregate labor demand would be di⁄erent across countries:






> LM2 + LA2 =
1
2 + T￿￿1 +
1
1 + T1￿￿: (18)
Thus, it must be the case that w1 > w2 = w3. Due to the non-homotheticity of preferences, this
implies that country 1￿ s expenditure is biased towards manufacturing: EM1 > EM2. As discussed
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Establishing analytical results here is di¢ cult, but the condition 2 > T￿￿1, for example, is
su¢ cient for LM1 > LM2, which implies a larger manufacturing share in the central country.
A second reason why centrality favors industrialization is based on the di⁄erent elasticities
of substitution of manufacturing and agricultural products. Higher wages due to a more central
position lead to higher prices of both types of goods. If agricultural goods are more homogeneous
than manufacturing goods (this would correspond to ￿A > ￿M in our model), as is usually the
case, central locations will specialize in manufacturing, ceteris paribus. This is since demand for
locally produced manufacturing varieties will be less sensitive to higher prices than demand for
the country￿ s agricultural variety. The following example illustrates this mechanism.
Example 2 Again assume R = 3 and that all parameters are identical across countries
(except for the bilateral trade costs) and, in particular, that ￿Aj = ￿Mj = Lj = 1, ￿A = 1,
and ￿M > 1 but ￿nite. Again, we consider a geographic structure such that country 1 takes a
￿central￿position while countries 2 and 3 are in the ￿periphery￿ : here we model this by assuming
that country 1 can trade freely with both 2 and 3 (T12 = T21 = T13 = T31 = 1) and that countries
2 and 3 cannot trade with one another (T23 = T32 = 1).18 Trade costs are again equal across
sectors. We take the agricultural good as the numØraire. Under incomplete specialization for all






























18We again rule out the possibility that countries 2 and 3 can trade via country 1.
13It is easy to show that in this case country 1￿ s manufacturing share is larger than that of countries
2 and 3, since LM1 > LM2 = LM3. If parameter values in this incomplete specialization scenario
yielded LM1 > 1, then country 1 would specialize completely in manufacturing.19 In this case,






















5 = 1; (23)
















￿ < 1; (24)
which imply w1 > w2 = w3 = 1. Notice that the mechanism discussed in this example does not
depend on the non-homotheticity of preferences: assuming A
ﬂ
= 0 would not change the result
here.20
Finally, trade costs can also a⁄ect the response of specialization patterns to changes in pro-
ductivity. An increase in agricultural productivity, for example, will generate a ￿relative-demand
e⁄ect￿ in favor of the manufacturing industry through the non-homothetic preferences, and a
￿comparative-advantage e⁄ect￿in favor of agriculture. Which e⁄ect dominates depends on the
link between domestic expenditure and production and thus the level of trade costs. Under au-
tarky, where consumption and production are perfectly linked, the relative-demand e⁄ect domi-
nates, as we already saw above. Under free trade, where consumption and production are separate
choices, the comparative advantage e⁄ect dominates. Outside these two extreme cases, with in-
termediate values for trade costs, which e⁄ect dominates depends on parameter values. The
following example sketches some intuition for this case.
Example 3 Consider many countries (R large). For simplicity, we assume again ￿M =
￿A = ￿. All country-pairs face the same bilateral trade costs: TM
jl = TA
jl = T > 1 for all j 6= l.
All countries have the same population size and productivities, ￿Aj = ￿Mj = Lj = 1 for all j,

































19Under the assumption ￿A = 1, there is no need for every country to produce its own ￿variety￿ of the
agricultural good.
20A third mechanism which could generate higher levels of industrialization in the center is based on the manufac-
turing industry having access to both a constant returns to scale and an increasing returns to scale (IRS) production
technique (see Murphy et al., 1989a/b). In this case, central locations would be the ￿rst, ceteris paribus, to reach
the critical level of demand that makes IRS production pro￿table. This mechanism is absent from our model, as
we assume constant returns to scale across sectors.
14for countries 1 and j. Assuming that trade costs are such that countries consume sizable amounts
of foreign goods, one can neglect the e⁄ect of ￿A1 on the price levels PMl and PAl. A high ￿A1
therefore has a direct e⁄ect in the denominator of equation (25) and an indirect e⁄ect via a high
w1 in the terms EM1 and EA1 of both equations. Notice ￿rst that the direct e⁄ect of ￿A1 raises
country 1￿ s agricultural share in GDP (the comparative-advantage e⁄ect). Second, a higher w1
(due to a higher ￿A1) tilts relative expenditure towards manufacturing in both country 1 and
country j because of the non-homotheticity in demand, but more so in country 1 due to the
presence of trade costs. As discussed above, this relative-demand e⁄ect operates in the direction
opposite to the comparative-advantage e⁄ect.
5 A Calibrated Multi-Country Model of Industrialization
The discussion in Section 4 has shown that our model is, in principle, able to replicate the stylized
facts from the introduction. However, our results relied on a number of simplifying assumptions
and may not generalize to the full model from Section 3 which, as discussed, does not have an
analytical solution. Also, the exact magnitude of parameter values mattered a great deal for the
direction of results, especially in example 3.
This is why we complement the analytical results with a full-scale multi-country calibration
of our model. That is, we ask to what extent the model matches our stylized facts for empirically
plausible parameter values. In the following, we choose parameters to match international trade
and expenditure data and use this calibrated model to generate data on manufacturing shares and
the independent variables used in the regressions in Tables 1 and 2 (more details on how exactly
this is done are provided below). Intuitively, if the true data generating process for our variables
of interest is similar to the one postulated by our model, we should expect to ￿nd comparable
multivariate correlations in both the real and the generated data.21
5.1 Parameter Values
For a calibrated version of our model, we need data on the size of countries￿workforces (Ll) and
productivity levels (￿Al, ￿Ml), and values for the parameters governing substitution elasticities
(￿A, ￿M), trade costs (TA
lj , TM
lj ), the manufacturing expenditure share (￿), and subsistence
consumption (A
ﬂ
). Table 3 provides parameter estimates and a brief description of the calibration
procedure and data sources used. In the following, we describe the calibration in more detail.
Data requirements limit the sample to 107 countries for the year 2000, 79 of which are classi￿ed
21Note that we are not primarily interested in matching the cross-section of manufacturing shares and the
independent variables in Tables 1 and 2 as closely as possible, but only ask our model to reproduce (univariate
and multivariate) correlations found in the real data. This is of course a strictly weaker test than trying to match
the above variables exactly. (If we succeeded in doing so, we would naturally be able to reproduce the correlations
as well). To be sure, matching the entire distribution of the variables from Tables 1 and 2 is also interesting but
would require a yet more complicated model and is beyond the research objective of this paper (which, to reiterate,
is to explain correlations in the data which are at odds with existing theories). Having said this, we provide some
evidence below that the version of our model with positive but ￿nite trade costs is actually more successful in
matching the cross-sectional variation in manufacturing shares than versions based on autarky or free trade.
15as developing and will be used in our regression analysis of the simulated data.22
We follow Feenstra (1994) in using variation in import quantities and prices to identify elas-
ticities of substitution among manufacturing and agricultural varieties (￿A, ￿M). This approach,
as extended by Broda and Weinstein (2006) and Broda et al. (2006), has become the dominant
method for estimating substitution elasticities in the international trade literature in recent years.
In our setting, it has the additional advantage of building on a very similar demand structure as
our paper (CES and Armington varieties), while allowing for more general supply side features.
We adapt this approach to our setting by using data which correspond to our calibration exercise
in terms of country coverage, time period and the de￿nition of sectors for which we estimate
elasticities. We focus on a discussion of our estimates in the following and refer the reader to
Appendix B for a more detailed description of the Feenstra-Broda-Weinstein methodology and
how we adapt it to our setting.
For our baseline elasticity estimates, we use cross-country trade data for the year 2000 but
restrict the estimation sample to the 102 countries which are in our calibration sample and for
which we have the necessary information on import prices and quantities.23 We obtain ￿M = 2:3
and ￿A = 2:3. For comparison, Broda et al. (2006) estimate elasticities of substitution between
varieties of goods produced in each of approximately 200 sectors, separately for 73 countries
(rather than imposing a common elasticity as we do in accordance with our model). The median
across these estimates for the 60 countries also present in our data is 3.4. Given the much higher
degree of aggregation in our data (two instead of 200 sectors), our lower estimates seem plausible.
This is because both economic theory and the empirical results of Broda and Weinstein (2006)
and Broda et al. (2006) suggest that estimated elasticities should fall as the level of aggregation
increases and varieties become less similar.24
As a robustness check, we also obtain estimates using data on imports by the U.S. from the
countries in our calibration sample.25 These data are likely to be of higher quality than the cross-
country data used before (see Feenstra, Romalis and Schott, 2002), although of course we only
have one importer now instead of 102. Using these data yields comparable coe¢ cient magnitudes
as before although agricultural varities are now estimated to be slightly more substitutable across
countries (￿M = 2:0 and ￿A = 2:6).
Since labor is the only factor of production in our model, we proxy ￿Ml and ￿Al by labor
productivity in manufacturing and agriculture, respectively. However, as already brie￿ y discussed
in Section 2, the cross-sectional variation in labor productivity across countries which we observe
22See Appendix A for a list of countries included in the calibration sample. All 107 countries will be used to
generate our synthetic data set as developed countries do of course play a major role in determining manufacturing
shares and centrality of developing countries.
23Three groups of countries only report one common set of trade data, explaining the ￿ve missing observations:
Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and South Africa; Belgium and Luxembourg; and St. Lucia and St. Vincent and the
Grenadines.
24Closer to our level of aggregation but obtained via a di⁄erent methodology is the estimate by Eaton et al.
(2008) who use French ￿rm-level data to estimate an elasticity of substitution between individual manufacturing
varieties of ￿M = 1:7.
25Again, we lose ￿ve countries due to aggregation in the trade data (see footnote 23), leaving us with 101
exporters (the U.S. is of course excluded as an exporter).
16in the data is driven by both di⁄erences in technological e¢ ciency and di⁄erences in prices. That
is, lp:l = V A:l=L:l = p:lx:l=L:l in terms of our model because we abstract from intermediate
inputs. Since we are only interested in ￿:l = x:l=L:l, we use data on purchasing power parities for
agriculture and manufacturing goods consumption from the International Comparison Program
(ICP) to construct proxies for p:l and strip out price variation from the data (see Appendix C for
details).26
Estimates of the trade cost matrices can be obtained via gravity equation regressions using






















The only bilateral variable on the right-hand side in the above expressions is trade cost Tlj. We
proxy for these costs by Tlj = dist
￿1
lj e￿2dint;lj, where distlj denotes the bilateral distance between
countries l and j, and ￿1 denotes the elasticity of trade cost with respect to distance. The dummy
variable dint;lj indicates if a trade ￿ ow crosses national borders (i.e., dint;lj = 1 if l 6= j and 0
if l = j). This is a parameterisation of trade cost which is common in the international trade
literature (e.g., Wei (1996)). Proxying all other variables by importer and exporter ￿xed e⁄ects
and adding an error term, we can rewrite bilateral exports as
XM
lj = dexp;M ￿ dimp;M ￿ dist
(1￿￿M)￿M1
lj e(1￿￿M)￿M2dint;M ￿ "lj;M; (27)
XA
lj = dexp;A ￿ dimp;A ￿ dist
(1￿￿A)￿A1
lj e(1￿￿A)￿A2dint;A ￿ "lj;A:
We estimate (27) in its original multiplicative form via Poisson QMLE, using data from the sources
listed in Table 3 and following Wei (1996) in proxying internal trade ￿ ows as domestic production
(gross output) minus exports.27 As has been pointed out by Santos-Silva and Tenreyro (2006),
Poisson QMLE can accomodate zero trade ￿ ows, which are common in our data, and leads to
consistent parameter estimates even in the presence of heteroskedasticity in "lj. Appendix Table
26Echevarria (1997) uses a similar approach based on U.S. data. One way of interpreting our price correction
of measured productivity is that we want to allow for more general price-setting mechanisms in the data than the
restrictive mechanism assumed in our theory. There, the simplifying assumption of perfect competition leads to
di⁄erences in productivity being exactly compensated by di⁄erences in prices. In principle, one could also address
this issue as in Bernard et al. (2003), who assume a speci￿c form of imperfect competition to generate variation
in mark-ups across producers (i.e., Bertrand competition and limit pricing in which the lowest-cost supplier is
constrained not to charge more than the second-lowest cost supplier). The drawback of this approach is that
results are potentially sensitive to the particular choice of mechanism generating variation in mark-ups. In our
context, data availability is an additional serious issue, since ￿rm-level data or at least information about within-
sector, across-￿rm productivity di⁄erences are required to implement the Bernard et al. (2003) methodology. Such
data are not available in comparable form for the countries in our sample.
27Again, we restrict our sample to countries which are in our calibration sample and for which we have the
necessary data. For manufacturing trade, we lose the same ￿ve countries as before due to aggregation (see footnote
23), plus Uzbekistan due to missing production data. Agricultural production data are unfortunately much less
complete, restricting the estimation sample to 66 countries. Using all 78 countries for which production data is
available only leads to minor changes in the estimates for the trade cost elasticities which have no impact on the
following results (details available from the authors).
17A.1 contains details of the estimation results, which are broadly in line with those from comparable
speci￿cations in the literature.28 In robustness checks below, we will also use estimates of Tlj
obtained by estimating a log-linearized version of (27) via OLS (see Appendix Table A.1 for
results). The distance coe¢ cients in both sets of estimations provide estimates for (1 ￿ ￿)￿ which,
together with our assumed values of ￿, yield estimates for ￿ and thus for Tlj = dist
￿1
lj e￿2dint;lj.
We again use data on nominal and real expenditure on food and manufacturing goods from
the ICP to estimate ￿ and A
ﬂ
. In the model, the nominal expenditure share of manufacturing in



















. For our simulations
below, we thus use the nominal expenditure share of manufacturing in total expenditure on food
and manufacturing (SEMj=(SEMj + SEAj)) of the richest country (Luxembourg) in our data as
a proxy for ￿. Likewise, we use the real food expenditure per worker of the poorest country




We now present results for the same regressions as in Tables 1 and 2, but this time we use
simulated rather than actual data for the year 2000.30 That is, we use the calibrated model to
generate arti￿cial data on manufacturing shares for the developing countries in our simulation
sample. Note that our model also generates data for per-capita GDP (equal to wages in the
model), GDP (wages times population size) and centrality (calculated according to (2), using
the same distance data but replacing GNP with model generated GDP). Thus, we use generated
data for both dependent and independent variables in the regressions below, consistent with the
notion that we would like to evaluate whether our model is comparable to the data generating
process in the real world. Population size and productivity data are of course directly used as
model parameters, and, apart from the price correction discussed, are identical to the data used
28In a recent meta study, Disdier and Head (2008) report that the mean distance elasticitiy of the 1,467 estimates
they analyze is -0.9, very close to our Poisson estimates. Most studies exclude intranational trade but those that in-
clude it ￿nd estimates of comparable magnitude to ours. For example, Wei (1996) estimates (1 ￿ ￿M)￿M2 = ￿2:27
for a sample of OECD countries between 1982 and 1994, compared to (1 ￿ ￿M)￿M2 = ￿1:99 in our estimation.
29Again, also see Appendix C for further details on the ICP data. We have also experimented with using averages
across the three or ￿ve richest/poorest countries, with similar simulation results. A signi￿cant downside of using
more countries is, however, that the resulting higher estimates of A
ﬂ
implied that we needed to drop countries from
the data for which the subsistence condition of the model (A
ﬂ
< ￿Al) was violated.
30Availability of expenditure and price data from the ICP prevents us from generating data for earlier years. In
particular, while the 2005 wave of the ICP has information on up to 191 countries (both developed and developing),
this declines to 115 countries in 1996, and to only 56 and 61 countries in 1985 and 1980, respectively. In addition,
developed countries are overrepresented in the earlier years, further reducing data availability for the purpose of
the study. The availability of productivity and workforce data in agriculture and manufacturing also worsens as
we got back in time, although not as dramatically as for the ICP data.
18in the regressions from Section 2.31
Table 4 presents regression results using our generated data which yield a similar picture as
our earlier results using actual data.32 The coe¢ cient on centrality is positive and signi￿cant in
all speci￿cations. Likewise, relative productivity is never signi￿cantly negative. Similar to Table
2, it has a positive impact on industrialization in columns 1 and 5, but loses its signi￿cance as
soon as we control for agricultural productivity. Thus, we replicate the basic ￿ndings highlighted
in the introduction and in Section 2.
Tables 5 and 6 report a number of robustness checks. We ￿rst demonstrate that augmenting
the model by a third, non-tradable sector (which can be thought of as services) does not change
our previous results. We now model the representative individual￿ s preferences from country j as
Uj = ￿ln(Mj ￿ M
ﬂ
) + ￿ ln(Aj ￿ A
ﬂ
) + (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)lnSj;
where Aj and Mj are de￿ned as before, and Sj = sj is the locally produced services good. Similar
to agricultural and manufacturing varieties, services are produced using only labor with linear
production technology sl = ￿SlLSl (where ￿Sl is labor productivity in services in country l).
In Appendix D, we provide a more detailed exposition of the model, the resulting equilibrium
conditions and analytical examples comparable to Section 4. As we show there, allowing for
a service sector in the model complicates the analysis somewhat but the qualitative results go
through as before.33
Regarding the calibration of this augmented model, note that since the third sector is non-
tradable and non-di⁄erentiated, we only require new estimates for ￿, A
ﬂ
, ￿, and M
ﬂ
(see Appendix D
for the modi￿ed procedure for obtaining them). In Table 5, we present the same set of regressions
results as in Table 4, this time using the calibrated version of the three-sector model to generate
our synthetic dataset. As seen, the results are both qualitatively and quantitatively very similar
to before. We conclude that allowing for an additional non-tradable sector does not change our
previous conclusions and we work with the initial two-sector model for the rest of this paper.34
31Note that in the regressions on generated data, we use value added per worker as regressors to ensure compara-
bility with the results from Section 2. Price-adjusted productivity levels are only used in the calibration itself, for
consistency with the theoretical model in which ￿Al and ￿Ml represent physical rather than measured productivity.
Thus, by using data on price di⁄erences, we are e⁄ectively allowing for a more general price-setting mechanism in
the data than in our model (also see footnote 26).
32Note that the set of countries is the slightly di⁄erent in Tables 1, 2 and 4 because of di⁄erent data requirements.
For generating our arti￿cial data, we require the same independent variables as in Tables 1 and 2, but also
employment in agriculture and manufacturing to compute workforce sizes (Lj). On the other hand, we do not need
data on manufacturing shares as before. Running regressions on actual and generated data for the 76 countries
present in both samples yields very similar results to Tables 1, 2 and 4 (available from the authors).
33Speci￿cally, we show that examples 1 and 2 above carry through in the presence of a third nontraded sector.
Example 3, for which we do not provide a clear-cut result in the two-sector case, becomes even more di¢ cult
in the three-sector case. The added complication arises for the following reason: in a two-sector environment, if
manufacturing expands, agriculture shrinks, whereas this need no longer be the case if there is a third sector.
34The three-sector model also allows for an interesting extension of our data and results. Since we are now
modelling the services sector as well, our model should be better suited to model the sectoral structure of developed
countries as well. A priori, there is no reason to believe that comparative advantage or centrality should play a
lesser role in determining manufacturing shares for this group of countries. In Appendix Tables A.2 and A.3, we
thus present results for the full set of countries for which we have data (both developing and developed). Table
A.2 uses actual data, while Table A.3 uses the data just generated by our three sector model. Again, both sets of
19In Table 6, we report a number of additional robustness checks for the two-sector model.
The ￿rst three columns use our alternative set of substitution elasticity estimates (￿M = 2:0
and ￿A = 2:6). In columns 4-6, we use ordinary least squares to estimate equation (27), leading
to alternative estimates for ￿1M, ￿1A, ￿2M, and ￿2A. Finally, in columns 7-9 we use producer
prices rather than consumer prices to de￿ ate relative productivities (see Appendix C). As shown,
none of these changes alters the basic message from Table 4. Centrality is positive and signif-
icant throughout. Relative productivity is positive and signi￿cant when we do not control for
agriculture productivity, and it is always insigni￿cant when we do.35
In Table 7 we compare our preferred calibration with positive but ￿nite trade cost (see Table 4)
to the cases of free trade and autarky (corresponding to zero and in￿nite international trade costs
in terms of the underlying calibration, respectively). As already noted, most of the existing models
in the literature are based on one of these two polar scenarios. Our comparison uses two criteria.
First, can the model replicate the qualitative correlations found in the data between comparative
advantage and centrality, on the one hand, and manufacturing shares, on the other hand? Second,
how well do all three parameterizations do in terms of replicating actual manufacturing shares?
To evaluate this second criterion, we regress actual on simulated manufacturing shares, and look
at the sign and signi￿cance of the corresponding regression coe¢ cient, as well as at the associated
R2.
Looking at free trade ￿rst, we see that the model￿ s performance in this case is dismal with
respect to both criteria (see columns 6-9; columns 1-3 replicate our baseline results for conve-
nience). The coe¢ cient on comparative advantage is, as expected, negative and strongly signi￿-
cant, whereas the one on centrality is slightly negative and insigni￿cant. The regression coe¢ cient
from the regression of actual on simulated manufacturing shares is positive but insigni￿cant, and
the corresponding R2 close to zero (see the last two lines of the table). The model￿ s performance
with in￿nitely high trade costs is somewhat better, in the sense that it can replicate the facts re-
lated to relative productivity (column 4-6). However, the coe¢ cient on centrality is insigni￿cant
throughout.36 Also, while the correlation between actual and predicted manufacturing shares is
positive and highly signi￿cant, and the R2 substantially higher than in the free-trade case, both
measures are lower than the ones generated by our baseline parameterization (see column 1-3).
We conclude that allowing for positive but ￿nite trade cost is necessary to replicate the stylized
facts discussed in the introduction, and also improves the ￿t of actual and predicted levels of
industrialization.
results are similar, con￿rming that the model also performs well when applied to all countries.
35For conciseness, we omit the speci￿cations also including population and per-capita GDP. Results are again
similar to those for our baseline calibration shown in Table 4 (available from the authors upon request).
36The fact that the coe¢ cient on centrality is not exactly zero under autarky is of course due to functional form
misspeci￿cation, given that the true data generating process in the model is more complicated than the simple
log-linear relationship postulated in our regression tables throughout. For future research, it would be interesting
to investigate whether using functional forms directly implied by the model have higher explanatory power in the
actual data as well. We note, however, that this does not invalidate our earlier comparisons based on log-linear
speci￿cations as the issue of functional form misspeci￿cation applies to both actual and generated data. If the
underlying data generating process was similar in both samples, we would expect the same log-linear approximation
to yield similar results (as indeed it does).
206 Conclusion
In this paper, we have drawn attention to two cross-sectional facts which, taken together, are
not easily explained by existing models of models of industrialization. First, proximity to foreign
sources of demand seems to matter for levels of industrialization. That is, there is a positive
correlation between manufacturing shares and the ￿ centrality￿of a country, i.e. its closeness to
foreign markets for its products. By construction, closed-economy models of industrialization
are not suited to explain this fact. We also noted that measures of centrality have substantial
explanatory power, explaining a comparable share of the cross-country variation in manufacturing
shares as one of the central explanatory variables in the literature, per-capita income.
While our ￿rst stylized fact seems to point to the importance of open-economy models, our
second fact suggests the opposite. Speci￿cally, a standard proxy for Ricardian comparative
advantage in agriculture (labor productivity in agriculture relative to manufacturing) is not or
even positively correlated with manufacturing shares. This contradicts key predictions of open-
economy models which predict that countries integrated through trade should specialize according
to their comparative advantages.
We have argued that to understand these facts, we need to move beyond the closed-versus-
open-economy dichotomy prevalent in the literature, and to consider multi-country settings in
which countries interact with each other through international trade, but in which this interaction
is partly hampered by the fact that trade is not costless. We constructed a simple model along
these lines and used analytical examples and a full-scale multi-country calibration to show that
it can replicate our stylized facts.
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24A Appendix A: Country Lists and Data used in Cross-Country
Regressions
Country List I - Cross-Country Regressions Albania (ALB); Algeria (DZA); Angola
(AGO); Argentina (ARG); Armenia (ARM); Azerbaijan (AZE); Bangladesh (BGD); Barbados
(BRB); Belarus (BLR); Belize (BLZ); Benin (BEN); Bhutan (BTN); Bolivia (BOL); Botswana
(BWA); Brazil (BRA); Bulgaria (BGR); Burkina Faso (BFA); Burundi (BDI); Cambodia (KHM);
Cameroon (CMR); Cape Verde (CPV); Central African Republic (CAF); Chad (TCD); Chile
(CHL); China (CHN); Colombia (COL); Comoros (COM); Congo, Dem. Rep. (ZAR); Congo,
Rep. (COG); Costa Rica (CRI); Cote d￿ Ivoire (CIV); Croatia (HRV); Czech Republic (CZE);
Dominican Republic (DOM); Ecuador (ECU); Egypt, Arab Rep. (EGY); El Salvador (SLV);
Equatorial Guinea (GNQ); Eritrea (ERI); Estonia (EST); Ethiopia (ETH); Fiji (FJI); Gabon
(GAB); Gambia, The (GMB); Georgia (GEO); Ghana (GHA); Grenada (GRD); Guatemala
(GTM); Guinea (GIN); Guinea-Bissau (GNB); Guyana (GUY); Honduras (HND); Hungary
(HUN); India (IND); Indonesia (IDM); Iran, Islamic Rep. (IRN); Jamaica (JAM); Jordan (JOR);
Kazakhstan (KAZ); Kenya (KEN); Korea, Rep. (KOR); Kyrgyz Republic (KGZ); Lao PDR
(LAO); Latvia (LVA); Lesotho (LSO); Lithuania (LTU); Macedonia, FYR (MKD); Madagas-
car (MDG); Malawi (MWI); Malaysia (MYS); Mali (MLI); Mauritania (MRT); Mexico (MEX);
Moldova (MDA); Mongolia (MNG); Morocco (MAR); Mozambique (MOZ); Namibia (NAM);
Nepal (NPL); Nicaragua (NIC); Niger (NER); Nigeria (NGA); Oman (OMN); Pakistan (PAK);
Panama (PAN); Papua New Guinea (PNG); Paraguay (PRY); Peru (PER); Philippines (PHL);
Poland (POL); Romania (ROM); Rwanda (RWA); Saudi Arabia (SAU); Senegal (SEN); Sierra
Leone (SLE); Slovak Republic (SVK); South Africa (ZAF); Sri Lanka (LKA); St. Lucia (LCA);
St. Vincent and the Grenadines (VCT); Sudan (SDN); Suriname (SUR); Syrian Arab Re-
public (SYR); Tanzania (TZA); Thailand (THA); Togo (TGO); Trinidad and Tobago (TTO);
Tunisia (TUN); Turkey (TUR); Uganda (UGA); Ukraine (UKR); Uruguay (URY); Uzbekistan
(UZB); Venezuela, RB (VEN); Vietnam (VNM); Yemen, Rep. (YEM); Zambia (ZMB); Zimbabwe
(ZWE).
Country List II - Calibration Sample Developing countries: Albania (ALB); Algeria
(DZA); Argentina (ARG); Armenia (ARM); Azerbaijan (AZE); Bangladesh (BGD); Barbados
(BRB); Belize (BLZ); Bolivia (BOL); Botswana (BWA); Brazil (BRA); Bulgaria (BGR); Cam-
bodia (KHM); Cameroon (CMR); Chile (CHL); China (CHN); Colombia (COL); Costa Rica
(CRI); Croatia (HRV); Czech Republic (CZE); Dominican Republic (DOM); Ecuador (ECU);
Egypt, Arab Rep. (EGY); El Salvador (SLV); Estonia (EST); Georgia (GEO); Ghana (GHA);
Guatemala (GTM); Guyana (GUY); Honduras (HND); Hungary (HUN); Indonesia (IDM); Ja-
maica (JAM); Jordan (JOR); Kazakhstan (KAZ); Korea, Rep. (KOR); Kyrgyz Republic (KGZ);
Latvia (LVA); Lesotho (LSO); Lithuania (LTU); Macedonia, FYR (MKD); Malaysia (MYS);
Mexico (MEX); Moldova (MDA); Mongolia (MNG); Morocco (MAR); Namibia (NAM); Nepal
(NPL); Nicaragua (NIC); Oman (OMN); Pakistan (PAK); Panama (PAN); Papua New Guinea
(PNG); Paraguay (PRY); Peru (PER); Philippines (PHL); Poland (POL); Romania (ROM);
Russian Federation (RUS); Saudi Arabia (SAU); Slovak Republic (SVK); South Africa (ZAF);
Sri Lanka (LKA); St. Lucia (LCA); St. Vincent and the Grenadines (VCT); Suriname (SUR);
Syrian Arab Republic (SYR); Tanzania (TZA); Thailand (THA); Trinidad and Tobago (TTO);
Turkey (TUR); Ukraine (UKR); Uruguay (URY); Uzbekistan (UZB); Venezuela, RB (VEN);
Vietnam (VNM); Yemen, Rep. (YEM); Zambia (ZMB); Zimbabwe (ZWE).
Developed countries: Australia (AUS); Austria (AUT); Belgium (BEL); Brunei Darus-
salam (BRN); Canada (CAN); Cyprus (CYP); Denmark (DKF); Finland (FIN); France (FRA);
25Germany (DEU); Greece (GRC); Iceland (ISL); Ireland (IRL); Italy (ITA); Japan (JPN); Lux-
embourg (LUX); Netherlands (NLD); New Zealand (NZL); Norway (NOR); Portugal (PRT);
Singapore (SGP); Slovenia (SVN); Spain (ESP); Sweden (SWE); Switzerland (CHE); United
Arab Emirates (ARE); United Kingdom (GBR); United States (USA).
Data used in Cross-Country Regressions.
￿ Share of manufacturing value added in GDP: World Development Indicators (World Bank)
and national statistics o¢ ces.
￿ Value added per worker in agriculture and manufacturing (in 2000 USD): World Devel-
opment Indicators, United Nations Industrial Statistics Database (UNIDO), and national
statistical o¢ ces.
￿ GDP, GNP and per-capita GDP (2000 USD): World Development Indicators.
￿ Population size: World Development Indicators.
￿ Bilateral distances between countries: CEPII Bilateral Distances Database.
B Appendix B: Estimating Substitution Elasticities
The demand side structure in Broda and Weinstein is very similar to ours. In particular, they










Mgt is the subutility derived from the consumption of imported good g at time t. Note that in
our setting, we only have two such goods (the manufacturing and agriculture composite good)
and that we assume a Cobb-Douglas rather than a CES aggregator. This does not matter in the
following because we are interested in substitution elasticities at the next lower level of aggregation
only. Similar to us, Broda and Weinstein assume that Mgt aggregates varieties di⁄erentiated by












where ￿g is the elasticity of substitution among varieties of good g and d
1=￿g
gct denotes a taste or










37Feenstra (1994, p.161) shows that allowing for quality di⁄erences is important to address the aggregation
problem arising from the fact that we only observe unit values rather than prices in the trade data. One problem
resulting from this is that we implicitly ignore changes in the number of varieties supplied from each exporting
country (we have assumed this away for simplicity in our model but such changes are likely to be an important
phenomenon in the data). However, Feenstra demonstrates that changes in the number of varieties are isomorphic
to changes in the quality parameters dgct, and thus captured by the error term "gct in the regression to be estimated
below.
26where pgct is the price charged by country c for good g at time t. From (30), we can derive the
following import demand function (expressed as import shares and in log-di⁄erences):
￿lnsgct = ’gt ￿ (￿g ￿ 1)￿lnpgct + "gct






and "gct = ￿lndgct.
Broda and Weinstein also allow for an upward-sloping supply curve of the form:




where !g ￿ 0 is the inverse supply elasticity,  gt =
!g
1+!g lnEgt, Egt is total expenditure on
good g at time t in the importing country, and ￿gct = 1
1+!g￿ln￿gct captures random changes in
the technology factor ￿gct. Crucially for the identi￿cation strategy below, Broda and Weinstein
further assume that demand and supply shocks are independent, implying E ("gct￿gct) = 0.
Supply and demand can be rewritten to eliminate the intercepts ’gt and  gt by normalizing
with respect to a reference country k:38
"k
gct = ￿k lnsgct + (￿g ￿ 1)￿k lnpgct
￿k




where ￿k lnpgct = ￿lnpgct ￿ ￿k lnpgkt, etc. To take advantage of E ("gct￿gct) = 0, we multiply















(1+!g)(￿g￿1) and ￿2 =
!g(￿g￿2)￿1
(1+!g)(￿g￿1). Although ugct = "gct￿gct is correlated with shares
and prices, we can obtain consistent estimates of ￿1 and ￿2 by implementing the following between













By the assumption of independence of "gct and ￿gct, we know that E (ugc) = 0 and thus plim(ugc) =
0 as the number of periods T approaches in￿nity. So the error term in (32) vanishes, solving the
problem of correlation with the regressors. We estimate (32) using weighted least squares to
obtain estimates for ￿1 and ￿2.39 Using the de￿nition of ￿1 and ￿2 above, we then solve for !g
and ￿g.40
38We choose the reference country so that the number of usable observations is maximised (we need share price
data for both country c and the reference country k). We use the U.S. and Canada as reference countries for the
cross-country sample and the U.S. import sample, respectively.
39We follow Broda and Weinstein (2006, pp. 582-584) in adding an additional term inversely related to the
quantity of imports from a given country on the right-hand side of (32) and in weighting the data so that the
variances are more sensitive to price movements based on large import quantities than small ones. Broda and
Weinstein show that this helps addressing problems arising from measurement error due to the use of unit values
(rather than actual prices).
40If this approach produces economically infeasible estimates (i.e., ￿g ￿ 1 or !g < 0), Broda and Weinstein
propose to do a grid search over a large set of feasible values. Fortunately, we did not encounter this problem in
our estimation.
27C Appendix C: Using ICP Data to Proxy for Prices
In Sections 2 and 5 we use data from the International Comparison Project (ICP) to strip out price
variation from measured productivity. To understand this approach, note that the ICP provides
data on a number of expenditure categories in both current U.S. dollars and so-called international
dollars ($I). One $I is the amount of goods and services one U.S. dollar would purchase in the USA
in the base period (2005 in our case as no data were available for 2000). Converting expenditure
from current U.S. dollars into $I thus removes any price di⁄erences across countries and basically
converts expenditures into quantities using implicit aggregators. By comparing local expenditures
in U.S. dollars and international dollars, one can derive country-product-speci￿c PPP exchange
rates which capture price di⁄erences across country. For example, per capita expenditure on food
in current U.S. dollars was $2,040 in 2005 in the United Kingdom but only 1,586 $I, yielding an
implicit price of 1.29 (the price in the USA is normalized to 1). Dividing measured productivity
levels (pMlml=LMl and pAlal=LAl) by this price converts them into quantities per unit of labor
used and thus into appropriate proxies for ￿Ml = ml=LMl and ￿Al = al=LAl. We note that
Echevarria (1997) uses a similar procedure, calculating proxies for agricultural and manufacturing
prices by dividing expenditures in U.S. dollars by expenditures in international dollars.
One problem with the above approach is that we are implicitly using consumer prices rather
than producer prices to de￿ ate production. In terms of our model, ICP prices are proxies for PMl
and PAl, not pMl and pAl. As a robustness check in section 5, we therefore use the de￿nition of























Together with data on the elasticities of substitution and trade costs which we have obtained
independently as part of our calibration strategy, we can solve the above system of equations for
pMl and pAl. In practice, consumer and implied producer prices are almost identical, with a corre-
lation coe¢ cient of above 99% and a level di⁄erence of on average less than 4% for manufacturing
and less than 1% for agriculture.
D Appendix D: A Three-Sector Model
This appendix works out a three-sector model where the third sector, services, is assumed to be
nontraded. We allow for non-homotheticities in demand to a⁄ect the manufacturing sector, too,
as this is has been considered in the literature relatively often. (See, for example, Matsuyama
(2009).)
D.1 Demand Side
The individual￿ s preferences are now
Uj = ￿ln(Mj ￿ M
ﬂ
) + ￿ ln(Aj ￿ A
ﬂ






















Sj = sj; (38)




< ￿Ml, ￿A;￿M > 1. The individual￿ s budget constraint is
PAjAj + PMjMj + PSjSj = wj: (39)
As we discuss below, total income equals labor income, as pro￿ts are zero. The price indices in









































PSj = pSj: (42)
where TA
lj ;TM
lj ￿ 1, TA
jj;TM
jj = 1. Implicit here is the assumption that sector S is non-traded.















































Goods are produced with linear technologies:
al = ￿AlLAl; (49)
ml = ￿MlLMl; (50)





























































































































These are R non-linear equations in the R wage rates.
D.4 Autarky






































Ll ￿ (LAl + LMl)
Ll






















The relative share of the services sector depends positively on the country￿ s wage (as long as the












Example 1 with three sectors Consider a three-country world, R = 3, and a geographic
structure such that country 1 takes a ￿central￿position while countries 2 and 3, which are fully
symmetric, are in the ￿periphery￿ : we model this by assuming that country 1 can trade with
both 2 and 3 at positive but ￿nite trade costs (T12 = T21 = T13 = T31 = T > 1) and that
countries 2 and 3 cannot trade with one another (T23 = T32 = 1). Trade costs are assumed
equal across industries. We simplify further by assuming ￿M = ￿A = ￿. Finally, assume all
parameters are identical across countries (except for the bilateral trade costs) and, in particular,
that ￿Aj = ￿Mj = ￿Sj = Lj = 1 and M
ﬂ
= 0. Pro￿ting from the symmetry we have imposed, let
us normalize w2 = w3 = 1.
The results discussed in example 1 above apply here as well.
Example 2 with three sectors Assume all parameters are identical across countries (ex-
cept for the bilateral trade costs) and, in particular, that ￿Aj = ￿Mj = ￿Sj = Lj = 1, ￿A = 1,




= 0. Again, we consider a geo-
graphic structure such that country 1 takes a ￿central￿position while countries 2 and 3 are in
the ￿periphery￿ : here we model this by assuming that country 1 can trade freely with both 2
and 3 (T12 = T21 = T13 = T31 = 1) and that countries 2 and 3 cannot trade with one another
(T23 = T32 = 1). Trade costs are equal across sectors here. We take the agricultural good as the
numØraire.
The results discussed in example 2 above apply here as well with small variations. First, it
is easy to show that LSj = 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ for all countries. Second, it is easy to show as well that
LM1 > LM2 = LM3. Third, if parameter values yield LA1 = 0, then the labor market equilibrium
conditions yield w1 > w2 = w3 = 1.
D.7 Calibration
Since the third sector is non-tradable and non-di⁄erentiated, we do not require new estimates for
￿M, ￿A, ￿1M, ￿1A, ￿2M, and ￿2A (note that the expression for manufacturing and agricultural
exports in the model is the same as in the two sector version). However, we do require new
estimates for ￿, A
ﬂ
, ￿, and M
ﬂ
since ￿ and M
ﬂ
are new parameters and the meaning of ￿ and A
ﬂ
has
changed due to the introduction of the third sector.
To obtain estimates of these new parameters, we follow our earlier approach to use expenditure
shares and food consumption for the richest and poorest country in our data, respectively. To



































As wj ! 1, SEMj ! ￿, SEAj ! ￿ and SESj ! (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿). Thus, a suitable proxy for ￿ and
￿ are the expenditure shares of the richest country in the data.




PMj), consumption per head convergence to the




























































PMj is the income level which guarantees that the substistence level is




are real expenditure per worker in the poorest
country in our data (measured in $I).41
41Note that since we de￿ne ￿rich￿ and ￿poor￿ as total expenditure per worker (which is consistent with our
model), the ranking of countries changes slightly with the introduction of a third sector (services expenditure is
now taking into account in the de￿nition of income). That is, the poorest country according to a new de￿nition is
now Tanzania, explaining the increase in the estimate for A
ﬂ
in Table 2.
32Figures and Tables 
Figure 1: GDP manufacturing sharesand minimum distance to main markets (2000) 
 
Notes: Figure plots manufacturing shares in GDP (in %) against the minimum distance (in km) to either of the 
U.S., the European Union (Netherlands), or Japan. All dataare for 2000. See Appendix A for data sources and 
country codes. 
Figure 2: GDP manufacturing shares and relative productivities (2000) 
 
Notes: Figure plots manufacturing shares in GDP (in %) against the ratio of labor productivity in agriculture and 



































































































































































































































-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1
Labor prod. agriculture/manufacturing (logs)Table 1: Baseline Empirical Results (Developing Countries Only) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Regressor  ltShareM ltShareM ltShareM ltShareM ltShareM ltShareM ltShareM ltShareM 
    
log(RELPR) 0.0862  0.0850 0.130** 0.113**  
 (0.0686)  (0.0630) (0.0633) (0.0454)  
log(mindist)   -0.332***  
   (0.0754)  
log(CEN)   0.417*** 0.462*** 0.547*** 
   (0.126) (0.119) (0.133) 
    
Fixed  Effects  -- -- -- --  SE-Asia  Dummy SE-Asia  Dummy Year  Year 
Years  2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000  1980,  1990,  2000 1980,  1990,  2000 
Observations  83 83 83 83 83 83 256 256 
R-squared  0.023 0.118 0.073 0.026 0.236 0.274 0.045 0.093 
Notes: Table displays coefficients and robust standard errors (clustered at the country-level in columns 7-8) for OLS estimations. The dependent variable is the logistic 
transformation of a country’s share of manufacturing in GDP. RELPR is the quotient of a country’s agricultural labor productivity and its labor productivity in 
manufacturing. Mindist is the minimum distance (in km) of a country to either of Japan, the European Union (Netherlands) or the USA. CEN is a country’s centrality 
measure (defined in Section 2). All regressorsare in logs. Results on the included constant are suppressed. For data sources see Appendix A. *, **, and *** signify 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.  
 Table 2: Extended Empirical Results (Developing Countries Only) 
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11) 
Regressor ltShareM  ltShareM  ltShareM  ltShareM  ltShareM  ltShareM ltShareM ltShareM ltShareM ltShareM ltShareM 
    
log(RELPR) 0.130* -0.0220  0.0698 0.127* 0.140*** -0.0348  0.0279 0.0972**  
 (0.0680) (0.0805)  (0.0727) (0.0686) (0.0449) (0.0540)  (0.0519) (0.0459)  
log(CEN) 0.354*** 0.355**  0.287** 0.253** 0.413*** 0.370**  0.281** 0.298** 0.400*** 2.588*** 2.930*** 
 (0.128) (0.152)  (0.121) (0.123) (0.129) (0.142)  (0.113) (0.114) (0.137) (0.881) (0.980) 
log(POP) 0.177***   0.186*** 0.196*** 0.171*** 0.181*** 0.187*** 0.186*** 0.953*** 0.602 
 (0.0267)   (0.0279) (0.0289) (0.0247) (0.0235) (0.0233) (0.0225) (0.265) (0.481) 
log(AP) 0.0745  0.124** 0.190***  0.220***  
 (0.0667)  (0.0613) (0.0655)  (0.0557)  
log(PCGDP)  0.139** 0.197*** 0.190*** 0.289*** 0.0854 
   (0.0534) (0.0523) (0.0469) (0.101) (0.170) 
    











2000  1980-2005 1980-2005 1980-2005 
Observations 83 83  83 83 256 256  256 256 2,977 2,977 73 
R-squared 0.319 0.086  0.353 0.380 0.305 0.175  0.399 0.398 0.340 0.877 0.145 
Notes: Table displays coefficients and robust standard errors (clustered at the country-level in columns 5-11) for OLS estimations. The dependent variable is the logistic 
transformation of a country’s share of manufacturing in GDP. RELPR is the quotient of a country’s agricultural labor productivity and its labor productivity in 
manufacturing. Mindist is the minimum distance (in km) of a country to either of Japan, the European Union (Netherlands) or the USA. CEN is a country’s centrality 
measure (defined in Section 2). POP is a country’s population size, AP its labor productivity in agriculture and PCGDP its per-capita GDP, respectively. All 
regressorsare in logs. Results on the included constant are suppressed. For data sources see Appendix A. *, **, and *** signify statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% levels.    Table 3: Calibrated Parameter Values 
Parameter  Value (Baseline)  Value (Robustness) Outline of Calibration Procedure Data sources 
σA  2.3 2.6 
Estimated on cross-country (baseline) and U.S. (robustness) data on 
import quantities and prices for the year 2000, following Broda and 
Weinstein (2006) and Broda, Greenfield and Weinstein (2006). 
UN-NBER (Feenstra 
et al., 2005) 
σM  2.3 2.0  US-NBER (Feenstra 
et al., 2002) 
θAl, θMl  country- and sector-specific  Labor productivity in manufacturing and agriculture, corrected for 
sector specific price differences.  UNIDO, WDI, ICP 
Tlj=e
δ1*d(int)distlj




Coefficients on bilateral distance and internal trade flow dummies 
from gravity equation estimations (baseline: Poisson QML; 
robustness: OLS). 
NBER, FAO, CEPII 
A, α  A=170$I/year, α=0.81  Manufacturing expenditure share of richest country (α) and food 
expenditure per worker of the poorest country (A) in data.  ICP 
A, M; α, β  A=285$I/year, β=0.07 
M=100$I/year, α=0.29 
3-sector model only. Manufacturing and agricultural expenditure share 
of richest country (α and β) and food and manufacturing expenditure 
per worker of the poorest country (A and M). 
ICP 
Notes: Table shows parameter estimates used for the model calibration in Section 5. Also listed are outlines of the calibration procedures and the data sources used (see 
Section 5 and Appendices B, C and D for details). $I denotes international dollars. 
 
 
  Table 4: Results for Generated Data (Baseline) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Regressor  ltShareM ltShareM ltShareM ltShareM ltShareM 
    
log(RELPR) 0.206***  -0.027 -0.023  0.319***
 (0.048)  (0.038) (0.039)  (0.041)
log(CEN)   0.516*** 0.187* 0.181*  0.229**
   (0.156) (0.097) (0.093)  (0.088)
log(AP)   0.395*** 0.399*** 
   (0.047) (0.051) 
log(POP)   0.007  0.187***
   (0.016)  (0.032)
log(PCGDP)     0.665***
     (0.079)
    
Observations 79 79 79 79 79
R-squared 0.176  0.145 0.721 0.722  0.801
Notes: Table displays coefficients and robust standard errors for OLS estimations using generated data 
(see Section 5 for details). The dependent variable is the logistic transformation of a country’s share of 
manufacturing in GDP. RELPR is the quotient of a country’s agricultural labor productivity and its labor 
productivity in manufacturing. CEN is a country’s centrality measure (defined in Section 2). POP is a 
country’s population size, AP its labor productivity in agriculture, and PCGDP its per-capita GDP, 
respectively. All regressorsare in logs. Results on the included constant are suppressed. *, **, and *** 
signify statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.  
 
Table 5: Results for Generated Data (Developing Countries, Three-Sector Model) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Regressor  ltShareM ltShareM ltShareM ltShareM ltShareM 
    
log(RELPR) 0.175***  0.002 0.012  0.227***
 (0.047)  (0.032) (0.034)  (0.046)
log(CEN)   0.501*** 0.194** 0.184**  0.197**
   (0.154) (0.092) (0.089)  (0.080)
log(AP)   0.277*** 0.283*** 
   (0.054) (0.057) 
log(POP)   0.021  0.150***
   (0.019)  (0.038)
log(PCGDP)     0.478***
     (0.091)
    
Observations 79 79 79 79 79
R-squared 0.164  0.165 0.535 0.541  0.661
Notes: Table displays coefficients and robust standard errors for OLS estimations using generated data 
(see Section 5 for details). The dependent variable is the logistic transformation of a country’s share of 
manufacturing in GDP. RELPR is the quotient of a country’s agricultural labor productivity and its labor 
productivity in manufacturing. CEN is a country’s centrality measure (defined in Section 2). POP is a 
country’s population size, AP its labor productivity in agriculture, and PCGDP its per-capita GDP, 
respectively. All regressors are in logs. Results on the included constant are suppressed. *, **, and *** 
signify statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.    Table 6: Results for Generated Data (Robustness Checks for Two-Sector Model) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Regressor  ltShareM ltShareM ltShareM ltShareM ltShareM ltShareM ltshareM ltShareM ltShareM 
      
log(RELPR) 0.207***    -0.023 0.231***   0.001 0.206*** -0.027 
  (0.047)  (0.038) (0.048)  (0.036) (0.048) (0.038) 
log(CEN) 0.502*** 0.170* 0.509***  0.139* 0.518*** 0.188* 
 (0.144) (0.089) (0.128)  (0.075) (0.157) (0.098) 
log(AP)   0.392***   0.397*** 0.395*** 
   (0.046)   (0.048) (0.047) 
           
Observations  79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 
R-squared  0.181 0.149 0.725 0.210 0.180 0.729 0.176 0.145 0.721 
σA  2.6 2.6 2.6 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 
σM  2.0 2.0 2.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 
Trade Cost 
Matrix  Poisson Poisson Poisson  OLS  OLS  OLS  Poisson Poisson Poisson 
Prices Deflators  Consumer  Consumer Consumer Consumer Consumer Consumer  Producer Producer Producer 
Notes: Table displays coefficients and robust standard errors for OLS estimations using generated data (see Section 5 for details). The dependent variable is the logistic 
transformation of a country’s share of manufacturing in GDP. RELPR is the quotient of a country’s agricultural labor productivity and its labor productivity in 
manufacturing. CEN is a country’s centrality measure (defined in Section 2) and AP its labor productivity in agriculture. All regressors are in logs. Results on the 
included constant are suppressed. *, **, and *** signify statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
 
  Table 7: Results for Generated Data (Baseline, Free Trade, and Autarky) 
 Baseline  Autarky Free  Trade   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Regressor ltShareM  ltShareM  ltShareM  ltShareM  ltShareM ltShareM ltShareM ltShareM ltShareM 
      
log(RELPR) 0.206***  -0.027 0.232***   0.011 -1.329*** -1.332*** 
 (0.048)  (0.038) (0.048)   (0.041) (0.011) (0.018) 
log(CEN)   0.516*** 0.187* 0.038 0.096 -0.023 -0.027 
   (0.156) (0.097) (0.110) (0.085) (0.027) (0.025) 
log(AP)   0.395***   0.417*** 0.015 
   (0.047)   (0.059) (0.020) 
      
Observations  79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 
R-squared  0.176 0.145 0.721 0.727 0.727 0.727 0.997 0.997 0.997 
Coeff. (SE) actual on 
simulated data 
0.777 0.777 0.777 0.722 0.722 0.722 0.175 0.175 0.175 
(0.208)*** (0.208)*** (0.208)*** (0.204)*** (0.204)*** (0.204)*** (0.109) (0.109) (0.109) 
R
2 actual on simulated 
data  0.147 0.147 0.147  0.133 0.133 0.133  0.0205  0.0205  0.0205 
Notes: Table displays coefficients and robust standard errors (clustered at the country-level) for OLS estimations using generated data (see Section 5 for details). The 
dependent variable is the logistic transformation of a country’s share of manufacturing in GDP. RELPR is the quotient of a country’s agricultural labor productivity and 
its labor productivity in manufacturing. CEN is a country’s centrality measure (defined in Section 2) and AP its labor productivity in agriculture. All regressors are in 
logs. Results on the included constant are suppressed. *, **, and *** signify statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.   Appendix Tables 
 
Table A.1: Gravity Equation Estimates for 2000 (Poisson and OLS) 
 Manufacturing Agriculture 
 (1)  (2) (3) (4)
Regressor Exports  log(Exports) Exports log(Exports)
    
dint -1.989***  -1.518*** -3.146*** -4.056***
 (0.119)  (0.368) (0.164) (0.578)
log(distance) -0.906***  -1.842*** -0.962*** -1.355***
 (0.052)  (0.029) (0.055) (0.067)
    
Observations 10,170  10,170 3,145 3,145
R-squared --  0.836 -- 0.716
Estimation method  Poisson  OLS Poisson OLS
Notes: Table displays coefficients and robust standard errors (clustered by exporter) for OLS and Poisson 
QML estimations (see Section 5 for details). The dependent variable is the value of bilateral exports. The 
regressors are a dummy variable (dint) which takes the value one if a trade flow crosses national borders, 
and the log of bilateral distance. Also included are a full set of exporter and importer fixed effects. Results 
on the included constant are suppressed. See Table 2 for data sources. *, **, and *** signify statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
 
Table A.2: Results for Actual Data (All Countries) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Regressor  ltShareM ltShareM ltShareM ltShareM ltShareM 
    
log(RELPR) 0.104*  -0.00138 0.0825  0.112*
 (0.0596)  (0.0754) (0.0700)  (0.0621)
log(CEN)   0.316*** 0.227** 0.215**  0.202**
   (0.0880) (0.0974) (0.0903)  (0.0943)
log(AP)   0.0590 0.0662* 
   (0.0403) (0.0392) 
log(POP)   0.158***  0.160***
   (0.0242)  (0.0245)
log(PCGDP)     0.0641*
     (0.0375)
    
Observations 112 112 112 112 112
R-squared 0.032  0.069 0.089 0.296  0.300
Notes: Table displays coefficients and robust standard errors for OLS estimations using generated data 
(see Section 5 for details). The dependent variable is the logistic transformation of a country’s share of 
manufacturing in GDP. RELPR is the quotient of a country’s agricultural labor productivity and its labor 
productivity in manufacturing. CEN is a country’s centrality measure (defined in Section 2). POP is a 
country’s population size, AP its labor productivity in agriculture, and PCGDP its per-capita GDP, 
respectively. All regressors are in logs. Results on the included constant are suppressed. *, **, and *** 
signify statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.  
 
  Table A.3: Results for Generated Data (All Countries, Three-Sector Model) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Regressor  ltShareM ltShareM ltShareM ltShareM ltShareM 
    
log(RELPR) 0.184***  0.054* 0.056*  0.164***
 (0.046)  (0.029) (0.032)  (0.036)
log(CEN)   0.338*** 0.089* 0.089*  0.081*
   (0.099) (0.051) (0.050)  (0.048)
log(AP)   0.128*** 0.128*** 
   (0.025) (0.025) 
log(POP)   0.003  0.083***
   (0.015)  (0.025)
log(PCGDP)     0.284***
     (0.058)
    
Observations 107 107 107 107 107
R-squared 0.202  0.141 0.411 0.411  0.525
Notes: Table displays coefficients and robust standard errors for OLS estimations using generated data 
(see Section 5 for details). The dependent variable is the logistic transformation of a country’s share of 
manufacturing in GDP. RELPR is the quotient of a country’s agricultural labor productivity and its labor 
productivity in manufacturing. CEN is a country’s centrality measure (defined in Section 2). POP is a 
country’s population size, AP its labor productivity in agriculture, and PCGDP its per-capita GDP, 
respectively. All regressors are in logs. Results on the included constant are suppressed. *, **, and *** 
signify statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
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